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Abstract 
The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is increasingly 
used in navigation and positioning in land, water and air appli-
cations. Although they are very useful and willingly employed 
in everyday live and commercial products, it must be stressed 
that GNSS alone does not always provide adequate perfor-
mance, particularly in demanding aeronautical applications 
where high level of integrity is required. Integrity and accuracy 
of positioning are the key parameters in air navigation. 
The paper presents research on current values of GNSS accu-
racy and integrity in north-eastern Poland, the region which 
until 2014 was out of official coverage of European Geostation-
ary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) Open Service (OS). 
The integrity and accuracy of positioning of static point and 
flying aircraft was examined in order to check present usability 
of different GNSS techniques which can be deployed for en-
route, approach and landing phase of a flight. Since the integ-
rity levels in aviation are strictly dependent on the phase of 
flight and landing of an aircraft, the analyses were performed 
in two computational modes: positioning using GPS/EGNOS 
data and using autonomous GPS. Both modes were calculated 
in en-route variant and because with the use of EGNOS it is 
possible to perform approach, GPS/EGNOS mode was also 
analyzed in Precision Approach (PA) variant. Overall assess-
ment of the accuracy and integrity of positioning in the studied 
variants is at the satisfactory level, not exceeding the levels 
defined by official aviation regulations.
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1 Introduction
Navigation of an aircraft is one of the crucial aspects in air 
transport. In order to achieve high level of safety it must be 
accurate and reliable. Nowadays GNSS offers new standards 
and possibilities for air navigation which can overcome many 
disadvantages of classical navigation systems. On the other 
hand, in order to use GNSS as the primary source for naviga-
tion in aviation, stringent requirements have to be met. GNSS 
use in safety-critical applications makes integrity mandatory: 
the timely provision of information to users about the level of 
trustworthiness of a position solution by defining the maxi-
mum deviation from the true position with a certain amount 
of probability [1], including the ability of providing alerts to 
the user when the requirements are not assured to be met. The 
American GPS system architecture incorporates many features 
including redundant hardware, robust software, and rigorous 
operator training to minimize integrity anomalies, however 
resolution of an unanticipated satellite integrity anomaly may 
take up to 6 hours. Even the best response time may be on the 
order of several minutes, which is insufficient for safety of life 
(SoL) applications [2]. For such applications, augmentations of 
GPS such as Aircraft Based Augmentation Systems (ABAS), 
Space Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) or Ground Based 
Augmentation Systems (GBAS) must be applied to achieve 
the requisite level of integrity. ABAS, SBAS and GBAS pro-
vide integrity in a multi-step procedure that is laid out in the 
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Mini-
mum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for airborne 
navigation equipment using: GPS not augmented by ground- or 
space-based systems - DO-316 [3], GPS augmented by SBAS 
- DO-229D [4] and GPS augmented by GBAS - DO-253C [5]. 
The most promising results today are offered by SBAS 
systems which provide valuable and cost effective informa-
tion for air community. The SBAS system used in Europe is 
called EGNOS, another operational today systems include the 
American Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), the Japa-
nese MTSAT Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS) and the 
Indian GPS-Aided GEO Augmented and Navigation System 
(GAGAN) [6]. 
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2 GNSS integrity in aviation
Integrity is the measure of the trust that can be placed in the 
correctness of the information supplied by a navigation sys-
tem. Integrity includes also the ability of the system to provide 
timely warnings to users when the system should not be used 
for the intended operation or phase of flight [2]. The concept 
of GNSS integrity has been originally defined in the civil avia-
tion framework as part of ICAO specifications required to use 
GNSS in the Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance/
Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) system [7, 8]. Integrity 
requirements consist of four terms [9]:
• Alert limit: The alert limit (xAL) for a given parameter meas-
urement (x designating the horizontal – H or vertical – V 
component) is the error tolerance not to be exceeded without 
issuing an alert.
• Time to alert: Time to alert (TTA) is the maximum allowable 
elapsed time from the detection of a positioning failure until 
the equipment annunciates the alert.
• Integrity risk: The integrity risk is the probability of provid-
ing a position that is out of tolerance without warning the 
user within the specified time to alert that results in hazard-
ously misleading information (HMI).
• Protection level: The protection level (xPL), where x desig-
nating the horizontal - H or vertical - V component, is statis-
tical bound error computed so as to guarantee that the prob-
ability of the absolute position error exceeding said number 
is smaller than or equal to the target integrity risk.
The values of integrity and other fundamental navigation 
parameters in aviation are highly dependent on the phase of 
flight, typical ICAO requirements for which are included in 
Table 1.
Since standalone GPS does not meet the ICAO require-
ments, different augmentation systems have been developed 
to fulfill them. In particular, all augmentation systems provide 
GNSS integrity services. Consequently, most of the integrity 
monitoring systems, techniques and algorithms have been 
designed to support civil aviation operations within the ICAO 
specifications. 
The basic form of augmentation is ABAS, which does not 
require additional ground or satellite infrastructure of the 
integrity system, but algorithms. The most common ABAS 
technique is called receiver autonomous integrity monitoring 
(RAIM), which can be used if there are more than four satel-
lites with suitable geometry available. With five satellites in 
view, five independent positions can be computed. If these do 
not match, it can be deduced that one or more of the satellites 
are giving incorrect information. If there are six or more satel-
lites in view, more independent positions can be calculated and 
a receiver may then be able to identify one faulty satellite and 
exclude it from the position determination calculations [7]. The 
requirement for redundant signals means that navigation guid-
ance with integrity provided by RAIM may not be available 
100 per cent of the time. RAIM availability depends also on the 
type of operation and currently it does not provide integrity for 
any approach requiring vertical guidance, which means it can 
only be used for non-precision approach (NPA) and operation 
like en-route or terminal. 
A key issue related to RAIM algorithms is that one of the 
objectives of their actions is to find measurement errors result-
ing from emergency situations which are very rare, with a typ-
ical rate of one error per 18 to 24 months in the GPS system. 
Due to the rarity of these errors, it is usually assumed that only 
one satellite may malfunction, or the probability of occurrence 
of a number of “defective” satellites is negligible [10]. Most of 
the RAIM algorithms work as follows:
• Computation of navigation solution,
• Detection of faults and anomalies,
• Isolation of faulty satellites,
• Determination of the protection levels (PL).
Table 1 Performance requirements for different phases of flight and landing of a civil aircraft [8]
Aircraft Phase
of Flight
Accuracy Integrity Maximum Probabilities of Failure
(2 σ  or 95%) Alert Limits (4–6  σ ) Time to
Alert Integrity ContinuityVertical Horizontal Vertical Horizontal
En-route, Terminal N/A 0.74 – 3.7 km N/A 1.85 – 7.4 km 5 min – 15 s 10-7/hr 10-4/hr
NPA, Initial Ap-
proach, Departure
N/A 0.22 – 0.74 km N/A
1.85 – 3.7
km
10–15 s 10-7/hr 10-4/hr
LNAV/VNAV
20 m
220 m
50 m
556 m
10 s
1–2 x 10-7/ 
150 s
4–8 x 10-6/ 
15 s 
LPV
16 m 40 m
APV-I 35 m
APV-II 8 m 20 m
6 s
LPV 200
4 m
35 m
Precision Approach 
CAT I
10 m
Precision Approach 
CAT II/III
< 2.9m < 6.9 m 5.3 m < 17 m < 2 s
<10-9/  
150 s
<4 x 10-6/ 
15 s
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Another, currently the most popular form of augmentation in 
aviation is SBAS, which allows for approach procedures with 
vertical guidance (APV). A key to providing APV approaches 
with SBAS is correcting for the signal delay caused by the ion-
osphere. This requires a relatively dense network of reference 
stations and complex calculations to ensure the integrity of these 
corrections [11]. European EGNOS operates in common inter-
national standard and currently complements the GPS system, 
by broadcasting on the GPS L1 frequency integrity messages in 
real-time and providing information on the health of the GPS 
constellation. In addition, correction data improves the accuracy 
of the current GPS services from about 10 m to about 2 m in 
the horizontal dimension. The data produced and transmitted by 
EGNOS thus include estimates of GPS satellite orbit and clock 
errors and estimates of errors due to GPS signals crossing the 
ionosphere. These parameters enable users to evaluate a limit 
from its position error. All message types transmitted by the 
system are internationally standardized. For each message type 
transmitted, there is thus a maximum refresh period which must 
be taken into account by the system transmitting the signal. A 
validity period is also defined; it must be applied by the user and 
can depend on the application. These intervals and periods of 
EGNOS messages are given in Table 2 [12].
Table 2 The structure of messages transmitted by EGNOS system [12]
Types Data contained
Refresh 
period
(s)
Validity period (s)
En-route,
Terminal, 
NPA
PA, APV
0
Don’t use for safety ap-
plications
6 60* 60*
1 PRN mask 120 ** 600 600
2 to 6, 24
UDRE (User Differen-
tial Range Error)
6 18 12
2 to 5, 24 Fast Corrections Variable** Variable** Variable**
24, 25 Long Term Corrections 120 360 240
9 GEO Navigation Data 120 360 240
7
Fast Correction Degra-
dation
120 360 240
10 Degradation Parameters 120 360 240
18 Ionospheric Grid Mask 300 *** 1200 1200
26 Ionospheric Corrections 300 600 600
12 UTC Timing Data 300 86400 86400
17 Almanac Data 300 None None
27 Service Level
300  
(if used)
86400 86400
(*) Message type 0 must be sent only if the system is not usable for safety-crit-
ical applications. After the reception of a message type 0 the SBAS signal shall 
be de-selected and all data received for one minute shall be discarded.
(**) The value depends on the degradation factor for the fast corrections.
(***) When the masks are modified, message type 1 or 18 must be repeated 
several times before the new mask can be used. This ensures that all users have 
received the new mask before it is applied.
3 Determining of the protection level
Since the values of protection levels in aviation are strictly 
dependent on the phase of flight and landing of civil aircraft (see 
Table 1), the analyses were performed in two computational 
modes: positioning using GPS/EGNOS data (for APV-1 opera-
tions) and using autonomous GPS (for en-route operations). In 
case of GPS/EGNOS mode pseudoranges from EGNOS geo-
stationary satellites were excluded from the solution.
Integrity in GNSS positioning augmented by SBAS systems 
is dependent on the geometry of the satellites, the impact of 
the ionosphere, troposphere, ephemeris errors, delays of GNSS 
satellites clocks and errors associated with the operation of 
the receiver itself [4]. During the research, the model used for 
determining the value of HPL and VPL was strictly in accord-
ance with the RTCA [4] guidelines. PL values are calculated 
using formulas [4, 13]:
where:
KH – a factor bounding user’s horizontal position with a 
probability of 10-9 (for en-route navigation KH = 6.18 and for 
precision approach KH = 6.0),
KV – a factor bounding the user’s vertical position with a 
probability of 0.5x10-7 (= 5.33).
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SU,i - the partial derivative of position error in the Up (ver-
tical) direction with respect to the pseudorange error on the ith 
satellite,
Variance of measured pseudorange for positioning using 
SBAS systems can be determined according to RTCA [4] by:
where: 
σ i
2  – full variance of the pseudorange measurement,
σ i flt,
2  – variance of the residual error after application of fast 
and slow corrections,
σ i UIRE,
2  – variance of the residual error after application of 
ionospheric correction,
σ i air,
2  – variance of the contribution of the receiver to the 
residual error,
σ i tropo,
2  – variance of the residual error after application of 
tropospheric correction.
When the degradation model is offline or data about it are 
not available, the variance of fast and slow corrections is deter-
mined on the basis of the following formula:
where:
σ i UDRE,  – standard deviation of UDRE (transmitted by SBAS 
system). If the value δUDRE  is not transmitted by the system, it 
assumes a value equal to 1.
When using the degradation model of fast and slow correc-
tions the value of σ i flt,
2  is calculated from the formula:
wherein:
RSS
UDRE
 – root sum square flag of UDRE (transmitted by 
SBAS system),
εfc – degradation parameter for fast correction data,
εrrc – degradation parameter for range rate correction data,
εltc – degradation parameter for long term correction data or 
GEO navigation message data,
εer – degradation parameter for en-route through NPA appli-
cations.
The variance of ionospheric delay is calculated according to 
the following formula:
where:
FPP – obliquity factor that transforms vertical delay to slant,
Wn – weighting function,
σ n ionogrid,
2  – grid ionospheric vertical error bound with deg-
radation over time, 
xPP, yPP – coordinates of interpolation grid points,
σGIVE
2  – grid ionospheric vertical error bound,
σ iono
2  – degradation of ionospheric correction information. 
For the I class receivers: σ i air m,
2 2
25= .
However, for the receivers of classes II, III and IV the vari-
ance of the errors associated with the operation of the GNSS 
receiver may be determined using following formula:
where:
σ i noise,
2  – variance mainly related to receiver noise and ther-
mal noise,
σ i multipath,
2  – variance related to multipath,
σ i divg,
2  – variance related to code pseudorange smoothing.
The variance of tropospheric delay can be determined from 
the formula:
where:
σ
TVE
 – tropospheric vertical error (0.12 m),
m(Eli) – mapping function for satellite elevation.
In contrast, the variance of the pseudorange measurement 
for autonomous GPS positioning can be determined by [3]:
URAi
2  – variance of satellite clock and ephemeris errors,
σ i UIRE,
2  – variance of the residual error after application of 
ionospheric correction,
σ i air,
2  – variance of the contribution of the receiver to the 
residual error,
σ i tropo,
2  – variance of the residual error after application of 
tropospheric correction.
The variance of ionospheric delay can be determined based 
on the formula:
where: 
Tiono – ionospheric corrections of Klobuchar error model,
FPP – obliquity factor that transforms vertical delay to slant,
Φm – geomagnetic latitude of ionospheric pierce point (in 
degrees).
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For the receivers not using smoothing of the code observa-
tions with phase σ i air m,
2 2
25=
Variance of tropospheric delay can be designated on the 
basis of formula (14).
4 Flight test
To use SBAS in aviation, not only the system must be opera-
tional but also the system validation in particular localization 
is needed, as well as official flight procedure design and certi-
fication. The research on the quality of the EGNOS in Poland 
carried out in recent years has shown that a lack of Ranging and 
Integrity Monitoring Stations (RIMS) east of Warsaw impairs 
the quality of the system, especially in eastern Poland, where 
Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) was commonly 
used instead [14, 15]. However, in 2014 a new official docu-
ment based on EGNOS upgrade programme, was published 
by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Enter-
prise and Industry showing that the declared area of EGNOS 
OS coverage was greatly expanded east of the RIMS station 
located in Warsaw [16]. Performed experiment and detailed 
analyses aim to present possible to obtain results of GPS and 
GPS/EGNOS positioning in air traffic in north-eastern Poland 
after implementation of new algorithms in EGNOS system.
The practical tests were conducted on August 29, 2014 with 
the use of Diamond DA20-C1 airplane. GNSS receiver taking 
part in the experiment - Septentrio AsteRx2 - was placed in the 
cabin of the plane while an external antenna was installed on the 
top of the cockpit in an almost obstruction free place (Figure 1). 
The analyzed data were recorded between 12:06 and 13:27 (GPS 
time), during which the plane passed the route including Olsz-
tyn - Tomaszkowo - Stawiguda - Pluski - Olsztyn (Figure 2). It 
should be noted that the model of the receiver used in the study, 
despite the fact that it is widely used in the analysis of EGNOS 
system, does not have officially required aviation certificates. 
Also, the antenna mounted in the cockpit of the aircraft, is not 
a dedicated external aviation antenna. In addition, the second 
Septentrio AsteRx2 receiver working as a static permanent 
EGNOS monitoring station at the airport Olsztyn-Dajtki EPOD 
was used in the experiment as a reference. The station was con-
nected to a choke-ring antenna mounted on a specially adapted 
mast in the location that had been previously tested for the pres-
ence of potential interference of the GNSS signal with signals 
generated by the communication equipment installed at the air-
port. During the test both receivers recorded GPS and EGNOS 
data with an interval of 1 second. 
In the first step of computation a true (reference) trajectory 
of the airplane for each second of the flight was established. 
For this reason, a Trimble Business Centre (TBC) Software 
was used allowing to get accuracy of 3D airplane positioning 
in the range of few centimeters. Following calculations were 
made with the use of Septentrio Post Processing SDK soft-
ware and a specialist PP_SBAS_Analyzer software developed 
by the authors. The self-developed application was used to 
perform data filtering, to determine the quality parameters of 
EGNOS system operation and to visualize the results of the 
experiments. It was designed to make any calculations strictly 
in accordance with the applicable official aviation documenta-
tion. Analyses were performed in two computational modes: 
positioning using GPS/EGNOS data and using autonomous 
GPS. Both modes were calculated in “en-route” variant and 
since with the use of EGNOS it is eligible to perform approach, 
GPS/EGNOS mode was also analyzed in Precision Approach 
(PA) variant. 
Fig. 1 The Diamond DA 20-C1 plane and measuring equipment involved in 
the kinematic test 
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Fig. 2 The test route trajectory registered on Aug. 29, 2014
For every analysed epoch (1 second interval) real-time posi-
tion using autonomous GPS and GPS/EGNOS data was deter-
mined. In the calculation algorithm “en-route” and PA variants 
were adopted. The differences in algorithms of these variants 
are: elevation mask (5° for PA and 2° for “en-route”) and the 
maximum age of applied correction data according to Table 2. 
The values of HPL and VPL were determined on the basis of 
appropriate formulas: (1–14) for GPS/EGNOS and (15–17) for 
autonomous GPS solution.
Figures 3–8 present the results of research with parameters 
characterizing the accuracy and integrity of kinematic and 
static positioning.
Fig. 3 The values of HPE, HPL and the number of satellites (NSV) used in 
“PA GPS/EGNOS” mode registered during the flight (up) and on EGNOS 
monitoring permanent station (down)
Fig. 4 The values of VPE, VPL and the number of satellites (NSV) used in 
“PA GPS/EGNOS” mode registered during the flight (up) and on EGNOS 
monitoring permanent station (down)
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Fig. 5 The values of HPE, HPL and the number of satellites (NSV) used 
in “en-ruote GPS/EGNOS” mode registered during the flight (up) and on 
EGNOS monitoring permanent station (down)
Fig. 6 The values of VPE, VPL and the number of satellites (NSV) used 
in “en-ruote GPS/EGNOS” mode registered during the flight (up) and on 
EGNOS monitoring permanent station (down)
Fig. 7 The values of HPE, HPL and the number of satellites (NSV) used in 
“en-ruote autonomous” mode registered during the flight (up) and on EG-
NOS monitoring permanent station (down)
Fig. 8 The values of VPE, VPL and the number of satellites (NSV) used in 
“en-ruote autonomous” mode registered during the flight (up) and on EG-
NOS monitoring permanent station (down)
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In the figures 3–8 the impact of the kinematic motion of an 
aircraft (with a fairly high speed up to 150 km/h) on the values 
of the parameters characterizing the integrity of autonomous 
and GPS/EGNOS positioning and can be observed. The violent 
maneuvers of the airplane caused a change in positioning mode 
form GPS/EGNOS to standalone GPS (red colour in figures 
3–6) which were not observed at static point. This was caused 
mainly by the decrease of the number of satellites (NSV) used 
in the navigation solution, which has a direct impact on the 
results of the analyses of HPE, VPE, as well as HPL and VPL. 
It can be clearly seen that GPS/EGNOS positioning (in en-route 
and PA variants) has improved accuracy (especially vertical) in 
correspondence with autonomous positioning. Overall assess-
ment of the accuracy and integrity of positioning in the three 
studied variants is at the satisfactory level, not exceeding the 
levels defined by RTCA and ICAO regulations. Table 3 pres-
ents the numerical values of the obtained results.
Table 3 The results of accuracy and integrity analysis of autonomous GPS 
and GPS/EGNOS positioning during kinematic and static test at the Olsztyn-
Dajtki airport
Type of 
examined
data
Parameter 
PA GPS/
EGNOS 
(flight)
PA GPS/
EGNOS 
(static)
en-route 
GPS/
EGNOS 
(flight)
en-route 
GPS/
EGNOS 
(static)
en-route 
auton-
omous  
(flight)
en-route 
auton-
omous  
(static)
A
cc
ur
ac
y
HPE
mean 
[m]
0.67 0.65 0.66 0.65 1.74 1.85
VPE
mean 
[m]
0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 2.67 2.74
HPE
RMS 
[m]
0.78 0.74 0.78 0.74 1.78 1.89
VPE
RMS 
[m]
0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 2.71 2.77
HPE
max
 
[m]
3.24 1.76 5.32 1.76 2.90 2.94
VPE
max
 
[m]
1.80 2.06 2.95 2.06 4.00 4.04
HPE
st.dev. 
[m]
0.41 0.35 0.41 0.35 0.38 0.39
VPE
st.dev. 
[m]
0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.48 0.45
In
te
gr
it
y
HPL
min
 
[m]
8.76 8.77 8.92 9.03 23.09 23.10
VPL
min
 
[m]
11.76 11.80 12.22 11.80 27.80 28.20
HPL
max
 
[m]
95.21 15.41 97.67 15.07 45.27 39.68
VPL
max
 
[m]
44.97 18.55 44.74 16.62 41.14 44.43
HPL
mean 
[m]
11.37 11.27 11.35 11.61 26.53 27.87
VPL
mean 
[m]
14.32 14.31 14.45 14.31 31.78 33.74
HPL
st.dev. 
[m]
2.72 1.32 2.79 1.36 2.22 3.90
VPL
 st.dev. 
[m]
2.01 1.47 2.11 1.47 3.20 4.59
Presented in the table 3 results show the maximum posi-
tioning errors in air traffic at: HPE
max 
= 5.32 m (in the case of 
“en-route GPS/EGNOS” flight) and VPE
max 
= 4.04 m (in the 
case of “en-route autonomous” static), which meets the accu-
racy requirements of the system to be used in aviation. In addi-
tion, the results obtained during the flight are not much worse 
than those obtained on static point. The discrepancies may result 
from a different geometry of satellites used in the kinematic 
and static positioning. The results obtained in the “PA GPS/
EGNOS” mode are similar to those obtained in the “en-route 
GPS/EGNOS” mode, which is due to the fact that the differ-
ences in the algorithms used for computation of these modes are 
not very significant. However, positioning using EGNOS have 
significantly better accuracy and integrity both horizontally and 
vertically with respect to the autonomous positioning. In general, 
integrity of positioning based on the values of PLs is at a level 
that meets the requirements of the NPA and APV-1 approach. 
However, it should be noted that maximum values of HPL and 
VPL for the kinematic modes “PA GPS/EGNOS” and “en-route 
GPS/EGNOS” reached: HPL
max
 = 95.21 m, VPL
max
 = 44.97 m 
and HPL
max
 = 97.67 m, VPL
max
 = 44.74 m respectively. In these 
cases, the violent maneuvers of the pilot going hand in hand with 
no perfect location of GNSS antenna, resulted in change of posi-
tioning mode from GPS/EGNOS to autonomous GPS and there-
fore the limit values of PL for APV procedures were exceeded. 
5 Conclusions
The subject of the study was to examine current autonomous 
GPS and GPS/EGNOS integrity and accuracy for flight appli-
cations in north-eastern Poland. The practical experiment was 
performed on August 29, 2014 at the Olsztyn-Dajtki airport 
and its vicinity. The observation data were collected with two 
Septentrio receivers, one placed on board of Cessna plane and 
second working at static permanent EGNOS monitoring station. 
Data were analysed in two different modes: autonomous GPS 
and GPS/EGNOS, strictly according to ICAO and RTCA guide-
lines. Both modes were evaluated in en-route variant and addi-
tionally GPS/EGNOS mode was also examined in PA variant.
Presented results of examination of autonomous GPS and 
GPS/EGNOS performance in north-eastern Poland con-
firmed the accuracy and integrity of GPS/EGNOS position-
ing declared by EGNOS provider, which is crucial to aviation 
applications. However, few gaps in GPS/EGNOS positioning 
during the flight were observed, it must be stressed that they 
were due to violent manoeuvres of the plane and the temporary 
location of GNSS antenna - in the cockpit of the plane. The 
future practical experiments concerning the use of EGNOS in 
air transport are planned to be performed with dedicated avia-
tion antenna placed on the fuselage of the plane. 
Nevertheless, achieved results and analyses presented in the 
paper are very promising and the use of GNSS navigation in 
aviation in Europe seems to be inevitable in the near future.
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